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Abstract
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, esoteric/occult ideas and movements 
played an important part in the intellectual, scientific and artistic life of Russia. 
Occultism lived in symbiosis for some time with virtually every 19th-century 
ideology, and, to a certain degree, it managed to convert this strange ability into 
the ideological environment of state socialism as well – a system that was officially 
hostile towards occultism. However, the relationship between state power, based 
on “dialectic materialism”, and the various forms of occult ideas that survived in 
that era was not always clear: it kept changing with time, and depended on the 
influence of those ideas on society. In this paper I will propose some frameworks 
for the interpretation of the bizarre dynamics between esotericism and Soviet state 
power, and argue that the reactions of state power to the various manifestations 
of esoteric ideas – from (quasi-) scientific to community-building and individual-
istic manifestations – require different interpretative approaches.
Keywords: Soviet science, esoteric movements, parapsychology, occultism, 
non-standard physical phenomena, resistance, secret service.
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Introduction
In December 1987, a strange trial took place in Moscow. Ninel Kulagina, a woman with psychic powers who had been well known in the Soviet 
Union for decades, sued the official gazette of the Ministry of Justice for 
defamation of character1. In January the court decided that calling Kulagina 
a “charlatan” qualified as libel, and obliged the paper to correct their previous 
statements. The decision of the court was based on the testimony of a num-
ber of academics, medical doctors and physicists who had been trying 
to make sense of Kulagina’s powers for twenty years and who all testified to 
the soundness of her claim. The experts unanimously said that there was no 
magic or mysticism involved in their research – they had merely conducted 
a scientific study of a number of unusual natural phenomena, including 
telekinesis (the ability to move objects without touching them) and bioenergy 
(Perevozchikov, 1988).2 This was the time of the triumph of perestroika, 
glasnost and democracy, at least in the eyes of those who considered themselves 
progressive: a simple citizen could win a lawsuit against an institution once 
deemed omnipotent. Therefore, other aspects of the trial were not discussed 
in public – not even the fact that, as became evident in the course of the trial, in 
the land of dialectic materialism and scientific socialism, substantial resources 
had been allocated to the research of realms in which the laws of physics do 
not apply, even before the dictatorship became milder, without officially 
informing the public of the results. The reaction to the Kulagina affair shows, 
on the one hand, that the non-official publicity of state socialism took the 
interest of the state in such matters for granted, and suggests, on the other, 
that this particular case was merely the tip of the iceberg, a manifestation of 
an internal struggle that had been going on under the surface for some time.
The relationship between state socialism and esotericism in successive 
periods of the former was at least as dynamic and diverse as the relationship 
1 Quoted in Perevozchikov, 1988.
2 In 1988, Tekhnika Molodёzhi, a widely read scientific journal for Soviet youth, published the 
complete minutes of the Kulagina trial in three consecutive issues. This unique document of the 
era would merit a thorough analysis in itself as, although what seemed to be at stake in the trial 
was personality rights, in fact, on a deeper level of their narratives, both the jurists and the scien-
tists who acted as witnesses in the trial faced the question whether there existed an unofficial real-
ity parallel to the “Soviet reality” which was about to perish at the time the trial took place. The 
legal representative of Kulagina consistently argued that it was not only in terms of human rights 
that perestroika had altered the ideological framework of the Soviet state: the scientific works 
that were used to qualify his client as a charlatan were ideological products, and as such, they had 
lost their validity. Absurdly enough, parapsychology came out as the winner of the argument, 
as it represented a new “alternative reality”. It was an era of stagnation not only in the political and 
economic sense: adsons as well: with the ‘efore, all of whomways froms
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of this bygone historical formation to other social phenomena – religion, 
ethnicity, tradition, sexuality, etc. The difference was perhaps that resolutions 
concerning debates about non-standard physical phenomena, beliefs, and 
behaviour related to such phenomena hardly made it into the public sphere, 
therefore these processes can only be assessed indirectly and in a rather 
speculative manner.3 The majority of literature on this controversial topic 
basically reiterates the facts known from the “second public sphere” of the 
time, and they mainly comment – whether explicitly or implicitly – on the 
cognitive dissonance that although the Soviet state and its satellite states 
were supposedly based on solid dialectic materialistic principles (whatever 
that means), they in fact had a keen interest in paranormal phenomena. 
In most of the cases, they were motivated by the curiosity to find out how 
hitherto unknown forces of nature could be used to rout out the enemy, 
both external (the “imperialists”) and internal (“deviant” people), and they 
were ready to devote financial resources to this aim. A number of works on 
this topic focus on hearsay about the superstitiousness of party leaders after 
Stalin. These leaders exploited occult phenomena and took them seriously, 
while this possibility was denied to their subjects. In the hospital of the 
Kremlin, bioenergy experts were employed, especially to cure Brezhnev 
(I personally interviewed one of them, Ruslan Magomedov, in 1996)4, some 
leaders of the state consulted oracles, like Bulgarian party secretary Todor 
Zhivkov who regularly consulted Vanga, a blind soothsayer, before making 
political decisions, or Gustav Husák, secretary general of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, whose government financed the development 
of “psychotronic generators”.5
3 There were some academic debates related to parapsychology, like the one initiated by leading 
Soviet psychologist Alexei Leont’ev (in co-authorship) in 1973 (Leont’ev, Lomov, Zinchenko, 
& Luriia, 1973). However, their critical attitude towards the “psy-phenomenon” was more prag-
matic than ideological or conceptual (i.e. they claimed that practitioners lacked competence and 
their results were not convincing). Cf. the Soviet public discourse on Leont’ev’s article and parap-
sychology in Menzel, 2016.
4 Parts of the interview were broadcast in a documentary programme of Hungarian Nation-
al TV (14 October 1996, 16:30 Tranzit. Közép- Európai Magazin – Tranzit, Central European 
Broadcast)
5 The literature available on these topics is virtually impossible to review. Let me just enumerate 
a few examples in order to show the type and reliability of the sources: some of these are memoirs 
of party and state functionaries, e.g. Baibakov, N. K. Sorok let v pravitelstve (Baĭbakov, 2011); 
or Chazov, E. Khorovod smerteĭ. Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko (Chazov, 2014); others are ar-
ticles without references, e.g. Alexander, 1980; Antonov, 2015; Greig, 2016; Maire & LaMothe, 
2014; Moiseeva, 2018. One of the most recent mystifications in this respect is PSI-voĭny: Zapad 
i Vostok. Istoriia voennogo primeneniia ėkstrasensoriki (Rubel’, 2013); Engl. ESP WARS: East and 
West: An Account of the Military Use of Psychic Espionage as Narrated by the Key Russian and 
American Players, by Edwin C. May and Victor Rubel (May & Rubel, 2014). (See a sober critical 
analysis here: Politdrug, 2015)
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In my paper I attempt to outline some possible directions for further 
research, as well as to reflect on some papers that have previously examined 
these phenomena, the methodology and approach of which could provide 
guidelines for the interpretation of this theoretically and historically extremely 
diverse topic which affected the fate of countless individuals. If one examines 
the relationship between state socialism and esotericism in the modern era 
from the point of view of our time, it seems quite clear that although both 
phenomena are rooted in the Enlightenment, the ideologues of the Soviet 
state were not aware of this. In other words, the cyclically changing relation 
of Soviet state power to phenomena that cannot be explained by science was 
by no means due to complex interactions between the political ideology and 
the specific Russian/Soviet academic narrative: these reactions were guided 
by random, often pragmatic considerations, and determined by personal 
character. The social, psychological, historical, scientific and political 
dimensions of esotericism in state socialism are so intricate that it would 
be next to impossible to find a uniformly valid interpretative framework 
which would include all the aspects. In what follows, I will present three 
reactions of the state socialist system for the control of esotericism – mainly 
in Soviet Russia – which only partly follows the chronological order and is 
based rather on particular manifestations of this version of esotericism, and 
their socio-political impacts. This may sound somewhat vague, but this is 
due less to methodological uncertainty and more to the fact that an issue 
which involves irrational elements by virtue of its character and is therefore 
hard to formulate in words, necessarily requires a lot of paraphrase.
1.   Controlled esotericism: parapsychology is subsumed under the natural 
sciences and the secret services. This involves an ambivalent but by 
no means prohibitive approach on the part of official, materialist state 
science to non-conventional research.
2.   Esotericism as a threat to society: movements, lodges and groups 
established at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries are eliminated, 
their members are physically annihilated. 
3.   Corrective control by the state power in the period of so-called thaw, 
then so-called stagnation: the state power considers esotericism as an 
ideological deviance of individuals or lifestyle communities, keeps it 
under surveillance, and in extreme cases separates such individuals from 
society based on supposed mental health issues.
There are examples illustrating all three approaches in the Soviet Union, 
a country which had an approach to science different to the Western one (as I 
will explain later) and a doctrinaire view of ideology, but this division is valid 
(with some qualifications) for the majority of societies under Soviet control.
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For practical reasons, I will refrain from an intellectual historical analysis 
of the concepts of occult, mystical and esoteric (often used as synonyms), 
and I will use these words in the everyday sense to denote phenomena 
which are hidden, or only understood by the initiated, and I will include 
“paranormal phenomena” as well.6 Instead, I will focus on the attitude 
of society to unexplainable, mysterious phenomena that lie outside the 
scientific paradigm.Natural Science: Esoterica under Control
In his book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval N. Harari calls 
liberalism, communism, capitalism, nationalism and Nazism “natural-law 
religions” of the modern era. A few pages before that, he claims that every 
monotheistic and ideology-based religion is necessarily syncretic (Harari, 
2014, pp. 200–202). How well occultism-related parapsychology fits into 
this syncretic world is well illustrated by a CIA report from 1977 which 
claims that the main difference between American and Soviet research was 
that while the Americans were busy proving the existence of paranormal 
phenomena to their would-be sponsors, the Russians were already working 
on applying such phenomena in practice (Hamilton, 1977). In other words, 
the scientists of the Soviet state – with relatively few exceptions7 – were 
not preoccupied with verifying whether clairvoyance, telekinesis, telepathy, 
mind-reading, aura or healing bioenergy existed, but with ways of putting 
these phenomena into practice. This is self-confident pragmatism indeed – 
but what is the source of such self-assurance?
According to Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (1997), the reasons go back to 
the past. In her book The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (1997), she 
convincingly argues that virtually every important actor of Russian culture 
before 1917 – from Diaghilev to Berdiaev, Khlebnikov and Malevich – had 
contacts with occult groups or at least the influence of such groups can be 
traced in their works. One would be hard put to refute her claim that in the 
years preceding the Bolshevik takeover, the whole of Russian culture and 
6 The terms mystical, esoteric, spiritual, occult, paranormal as well as their interconnectedness 
have always been difficult to define. The controversy and the specific nuances of the usage of termi-
nology in the Western and the Russian academic literature is described in detail in the Introduction 
to the volume The New Age of Russia: Occult and Esoteric Dimensions (Menzel, 2012a, pp. 18–23).
7 See Menzel, 2016 about the debate around Leont’ev’s article. However, in the article on Pa-
rapsychology in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, published between 1969 and 1978 and strictly 
reflecting the official Soviet ideological standpoint of the time, two of the authors of the incrimi-
nated article (Leont’ev and Zinchenko) are still hesitant to provide a straightforward statement 
about the pseudo-scientific character of parapsychology and related phenomena (“Parapsikholo-
giia: Znachenie slova ‘Parapsikhologiia’ v Bol’shoĭ Sovetskoĭ Ėntsiklopedii”, n.d.) 
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public mind was pervaded with occult ideas, but it is hard to tell whether 
these were coherent thought patterns and artistic motifs or rather the 
direct influence of Gurdjieff, Ouspensky, Steiner and other contemporary 
metaphysical thinkers. Although it is true that these motifs still appear in 
Russian art today, the ideological commitment of the artists is by no means 
as evident as Glatzer Rosenthal seems to suggest – using a motif in a work 
of art does not necessarily mean that the artist identifies with its ideological 
content. Besides, as I mentioned above, occultism was rather protean in terms 
of ideological content, and it readily adapted itself to local circumstances, 
often assuming national features, like in the case of the painter and occultist 
Nikolai Rerikh.8 Also, it typically flourished at times and in places where 
chaos reigned: where old rules had lost their validity and new rules were not 
yet strong enough – in Durkheim’s term, where anomy was rampant.
The early period of Russian spiritualism is well documented9, but one 
must keep in mind that this pre-history began in 1875 when the classical 
scientific paradigm still resisted the pressure of occultism in Russia. In that 
year, a committee for medium research was set up at the university of Saint 
Petersburg, headed by none other than Mendeleev. Contradicting several 
members of the committee, the chemist declared that spiritism was a hoax, 
yet at the end of his summary lecture he elegantly added that science must 
always be open-minded, and, rather than silencing new ideas, it must be 
ready to enter into debate with them (Mendeleev, 1876, p. 381). This gesture 
was judged by the bigoted Orthodox public – including Dostoevskiĭ – as 
tantamount to dancing with the devil (Dostoevskiĭ, 1972–1990, pp. 36–37). 
However, Russian science proved to be susceptible to such leniency: it was 
merely a matter of a decade before, in 1885, Bekhterev established the first 
experimental laboratory specializing in telepathy (among other things), and 
in the next few decades he developed a psycho-physiological theory based 
on “world energy” which is manifested in every living being – a theory that 
became one of the main tenets of Russian-Soviet psychology (Shingarov, 
1994, pp. 19–20). Although in his paper written in 1917 he declared that 
telepathy, at least in the manifestations that had been researched until then, 
was mere legerdemain, he made the same concessive gesture as Mendeleev 
had a few decades before: he denied that science could be divided into an 
“official” and an “unofficial” realm, and he did not categorically reject the 
further examination of telepathic phenomena (Bekhterev, 1994, pp. 321–323). 
Later on, every new era tried to give a theoretical explanation to the 
unexplainable: four years after Bekhterev’s laboratory had been established, 
Julian Ochorowicz, a professor of philosophy, psychology and physiology, 
8 For the origin and composition of Rerikh’s eclectic metaphysical ideas, see Osterrieder, 2012.
9 For details see Vinitsky, 2008.
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held a lecture on the electro-induction theory of telepathy. After that, every 
period that followed had its own theory explaining telepathy in the Soviet 
Union: the magnetic wave theory was born (Kazhinskiĭ, 1923), and a few 
decades later, it was developed into the radio wave theory (1977-1980 Gulaev 
and Kobzarev; the former was a crown witness in the Kulagina trial described 
in the introductory paragraph of this paper), accepted as authoritative in 
Soviet scientific circles. In Western Europe, Freud pronounced his ultimate 
verdict on telepathy virtually at the same time as Kazhinskiĭ pronounced 
his own in his lecture entitled “Psycho-analysis and Telepathy”, in which 
he relates telepathy to occultism, to be studied as a religious rather than 
a scientific phenomenon. With admirable discernment, Freud warns 
that the reason occultism is so virulent is precisely that it finds common 
ground with almost every new scientific theory, which gives occultism new 
ammunition for survival (Freud, 1921/1941, pp. 27–44). For the Soviet 
Union, this proved a self-fulfilling prophecy: protean occultism, especially 
those of its elements which could be used to influence the masses, tempted 
even hard-core Marxist and materialist scientists.10 It would be going too 
far to claim that that was the point where Soviet-Russian scientific thinking 
started to veer away from Western science, but their respective attitudes 
towards telepathy clearly demonstrate the essential differences between 
their outlooks.
In the background of all this, one can recognize the philosophical basis 
of Russian natural science, influenced by the ideas of Nikolai Fëdorov and 
Vladimir Solovëv, who were both strongly influenced by occult principles. 
To that, the scientific thinking of “Russian cosmism” was added, founded 
by Tsiolkovskiĭ (the father of Russian space research), Vladimir Vernadskiĭ 
(who developed the concept of the noosphere, i.e. the “sphere of thought” that 
replaced the biosphere), and Chizhevskiĭ (who researched cosmic radiation). 
10 If we accept that “alternative” scientific works were banned in the Soviet Union as a result 
of the centralized academic system and censorship in publishing, we must consider the point 
of view of Kazhinskiĭ, put forward in his book entitled Biological Radio Communication (1963), 
as “official” or mainstream. The central metaphor or interpretative framework of that book is the 
wonder of the age, electronics and radio technology, through which the author (and his con-
temporaries) try to explain the phenomenon of thought transference. He considers the human 
central nervous system a sort of “radio transmitter” the organs of which transmit signals that 
can be picked up by others, with the “receiver” having his or her own parts/organs to receive and 
decode the message. It needs noting that in his introduction, Kazhinskiĭ refers to Mendeleev’s 
“concessive” gesture quoted above and Bekhterev’s research (and to Lenin, of course, but that was 
obligatory at the time). He also recalls Tsiolkovskiĭ’s encouragement and support. Kazhinskiĭ’s 
argument is based on the idea that in the beginning of our history, human beings were probably 
able to communicate through telepathy, but they lost that ability in the course of evolution, and 
what we can experience and research now is only remnants of it. He puts the temporary lack 
of substantial results mostly down to the imperfection of our instruments (Kazhinskiĭ, 1963).
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According to their holistic theoretical “interpretative framework”, the 
human intellect must assume a leading role in the universe, and take part 
actively and responsibly in its evolutionary processes.11 According to this 
theory, higher, “planetary” consciousness can be achieved if humanity is 
transformed into “intelligent living material”, and subjects itself to universal 
morality. 
These theoreticians essentially preached the birth of a “new man”, a mys-
tical transformation, and the elevation of the Nietzschean Übermensch. 
Tsiolkovskiĭ, for example, who discussed the idea of a spaceship at the 
beginning of the 20th century, was confident that “The existence of tele-
pathic phenomena is beyond doubt. There is not only a huge amount 
of factual material supporting their existence, but almost every person who 
has a family is keen to relate their experience of telepathic phenomena”.12 
It is with this sentence by Tsiolkovskiĭ that Leonid Vasilev, the 
neurophysiologist whose research on stress preceded Western science by 
decades, starts his book on telepathy, written in the 1930s but not published 
until 1962. In this book, Vasilev argues with the interpretation of telepathy 
by spiritists and occultists, and defines the soul (the mind) as a spin-off of 
consciousness. All those people Vasilev refers to in this book – Kazhinskiĭ, 
Bekhterev, Setsenov, Leontovich, Lazarev and others – were hard-core 
natural scientists, as were the other Russian researchers of the first half of 
the century I  have mentioned before, all of whom excelled in their own 
field yet felt that they needed to pronounce their views on matters spiritual, 
going beyond physics without falling into the trap of metaphysics. And they 
may have been motivated by personal reasons as well: by embracing the 
“religion of man”, they may have sought to avoid the communist religion, 
or at least to find a way out of it. And, strange though it may seem to us 
today, they may even have succeeded, as most of these people managed 
to survive the decades of the Great Terror, and not only physically: they also 
managed to preserve their intellectual and moral integrity.13
In his 1963 book Vasilev writes a lot about parapsychology and its 
scientific grounding. The publication of this book coincided with the 
golden era of Soviet “non-conventional research”, the years from the early 
11 This is detailed by Michael Hagemeister in an excellent article (Hagemeister, 1997, pp. 185–202).
12 Although this quotation figures in almost all Soviet and Russian books that discuss telepathy, 
it is in fact not verifiable, as it is quoted by Kazhinskiĭ in his book mentioned above from a private 
letter dated 1923It was an era of stagnation not only in the political and economic sense: adsons 
as well: with the ‘efore, all of whomways froms.
13 Bekhterev is a special case in several respects: he served as a reliable point of reference for 
generations after 1917, and it is not certain whether he died from a natural cause after diagnosing 
Stalin. Chizhevskiĭ spent eight years in exile, but he was allowed to continue his research for some 
of that time.
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1960s to the 1980s, i.e. the period of “stagnation” as it was called then. There 
were some results, most probably, but only partial and fragmentary data 
were published about the research (Kernbach, 2016, pp. 35–57). It was an 
era of stagnation not only in the political and economic sense: this period 
of Soviet esotericism and parapsychology can be described as a sort 
of peculiar state-party and secret-service tabloid culture, without any real 
depth of thought or human drama. The main question in that period was how 
to send signals over a great distance from the human brain (i.e. telepathy), 
what the nature of energy emanating from the human body (bioenergy) was, 
and how to produce the signals and the energy from non-human resources. 
Laboratories were funded by the state and controlled by the state security 
services. In the first period – from 1917 to 1934 (the beginning of Stalin’s 
“great terror”) – technical electronic research was conducted in Moscow, 
whereas biological and brain research resided in Leningrad, with the two 
institutions being practically unaware of each other’s results, which were 
handled by high-ranking state security officers. We will probably never 
know what the latter made of the results, and accordingly, these institutes 
were eliminated by the Stalinist state. 
The greatest myth of the third period is the one about a plant called 
Radioson (radio dream), set up in the vicinity of Novosibirsk in 1973, which 
ran on accumulated bioenergy, and was supposedly capable of putting to 
sleep the whole population of a town occupying 100 square kilometres and 
lying 55 kilometres away from the plant.14 A number of accounts mention 
that, at the time, security services were always on the lookout for Siberian 
shamans and Central Asian healers, in order to teach their astral bodies 
to detect enemy bases from a distance. The KGB found this a cheaper 
solution than sending out agents, which was a much more complicated 
and risky venture. As soon as the US administration learnt about the new 
methods of Soviet intelligence, they started to finance the so-called Sungate 
14 The sources of these stories and data – memoirs and articles without real scientific value, found 
on the internet – are for the most part dubious and unreliable, e.g. “General KGB o psi-oruzhii” 
(2015), refuted here: Politdrug, 2015. Another typical example is Tim Rifat’s book, Remote View-
ing (2004) that can be downloaded from dozens of sources: https://targetedindividualscanada.
com/2012/01/19/tim-rifat/. In his book, Rifat gives an enormous number of data without refer-
ences or with incomplete references. For him, everything hangs together, but his conclusions, 
often drawn from correct statements or data, are dubious. The story of Radioson is told by Olga 
Greig, an author who worked with a similar method in her book Clairvoyants and Magicians 
Employed by the Secret Services of the World, with no references either (Greig 2016, p. 267). In his 
book written in Russian, Kernbach refers to Greig’s book when discussing the Radioson affair 
(Kernbakh, 2015, p. 117), which makes one doubt the credibility of the latter as well. While us-
ing these sources in my summary of Soviet parapsychology, I have tried to remain sceptical and 
ironical when discussing views and descriptions that are obviously phantasms. The most neutral 
and informative source I found is a brief timeline: http://ezolife.info/?p=6559.
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(initially Stargate) programme (the 2010 film The Men Who Stare at Goats, 
directed by Grant Heslov, is a parody of that programme), which involved 
training psi warriors. The intelligence services of both countries tried to 
squeeze as much money as possible from their respective governments for 
the continuation of their programmes, claiming that there was imminent 
danger involved. According to the 1977 CIA report quoted above, there 
were eleven such institutes of various size in the Soviet Union in that 
period, employing from 10 to 500 researchers, with a total budget of half 
a billion roubles15. In 2003, support for these institutes was discontinued 
under pressure from the Russian Academy of Sciences, and in 2004 the 
naturopaths of the Kremlin were dismissed (Kuzina, 2005).
As these occurrences could not be completely suppressed from the public, 
the state power applied doublespeak, as was their wont: “serious” experiments 
designed to develop psi warfare were controlled by the war department and 
classified (and foreign intelligence officers were misinformed about them); 
academic institutes were commissioned to conduct physiological-physical 
experiments, researchers published their articles outside the Soviet Union 
as well (Vasilev’s books, for example, were published in the West16), they 
attended international conferences on parapsychology, initiated public 
debates in the press, sometimes announcing that telepathy had been solved, 
at other times denying that the phenomenon existed, but they were always 
in control of what information could be disclosed to the public. Averting Danger to Society
To sum up what has been said so far, “psychotronic” research, rather 
inconsistent with the scientific materialism of the regime, was kept alive by 
the unique disposition of Russian natural science on the one hand, and the 
power aspirations of the Soviet state on the other. However, as I mentioned 
before, this was merely the surface: the story of alleged mysteries, unfulfilled 
scenarios and games of the secret services. The real drama was played out 
on a different plane, and that story is about failed lives, freedom and death 
in abundance. Occultism, the “whore” which tried to set up shop in scientific 
and philosophical discourses and to influence the creative aspirations 
15 The related sources, as seen from today’s perspective, are more speculative than fact-finding or 
documentary. For instance, Ostrander and Schroeder’s book published in 1970 (Psychic Discover-
ies Behind the Iron Curtain; Ostrander & Schroeder, 1970) and even its 1997 edition introduced 
by Uri Geller, despite its pioneering character is now read more as fiction than an analytical study. 
One of the most erudite (though still far from academic) visions on the issue is provided by Mar-
tin Ebon in his Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion (Ebon, 1983).
16  It was through the works of Vasilev that the English-speaking world was informed about the 
results of Russian academics, little known elsewhere in the world (“Vasiliev, Leonid”, n.d.) 
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of artists and natural scientists, plays a central role in this story as well. Here, 
however, occultism was not part of a project to be realized; it was merely 
a buzzword for the illusion of a freer life. If, as Harari claims, ideologies can 
be construed as religions, then one can say that esoteric communities and 
movements fell victim to the inquisition of the era, while their representatives 
were trying to prove that their ideas in fact corroborated the true religion 
of the state. In what follows, I will mention a few incidents which illustrate 
the mechanisms of state terror and the rear-guard actions of autonomous 
communities.
After the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, secret societies – esoteric and 
spiritist circles, freemasons and Rosicrucians, Knights Templar and 
Martinists – continued to operate in the big cities as if nothing had 
happened: their membership kept growing, their lodges kept functioning, 
they gave lectures, debated, and proliferated as before. In his excellent article, 
Konstantin Burmistrov provides an overview of the activities and beliefs 
of these communities (Burmistrov, 2012). The case of Boris Astromov, the 
well-known actor and a central figure of the esoteric scene in Leningrad, is 
emblematic, as it illustrates the dramatic clash between the spiritual mindset 
and the severe reality of the new power. He founded a new lodge in 1922 
when he fell out with some of the Brothers (scientists and public figures) and 
started to build a new network called Russian Autonomous Freemasons with 
his colleagues from the theatre and other artists. It is hard to tell in hindsight 
what those few hundred or few thousand intellectuals were hoping for at the 
dawn of Soviet state power. They were most probably unaware of the import 
of the events and thought that the secret nature of the society would protect 
them from the state security services. Astromov even offered his services 
to the NKVD and recruited some of the Brothers as agents, as he was 
of the opinion that freemasonry should be channelled into Soviet state power 
(Nikitin, 2000, p. 19).
“The Soviet power has already borrowed the symbols of freemasons: the 
pentangle, the sickle and the hammer … [and] the aims of communism are 
largely similar to the endeavours of Russian freemasons”, he wrote, adding 
that the Comintern would have to be reformed after the model of freemasonry 
so it would not be a thorn in the eyes of Western powers, and so that it would 
be able to continue working efficiently (“Astromov (Kirichenko) Boris 
Viktorovich”, n.d.). A noble idea, except that he wrote these lines in 1926 in 
a letter to Stalin when he was under preliminary arrest in the Lubianka with 
the other Brothers. As it happened, the leadership of the state security ser-
vices had changed in the meantime, and the new staff were not satisfied with 
mere surveillance. Astromov was imprisoned for years, then exiled, and, after 
another wave of repression in 1940, kept in a labour camp until his death.
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Occultists who lived in Moscow also met their fate soon enough: 
in 1928, those who were related to occultist circles in any way were arrested 
almost to a man, even though they operated in deep secrecy. It is perhaps 
not surprising that, before they were arrested, one of the missions of these 
circles had been to contribute to the research of the Moscow Institute 
of Brain Research on telepathy and telekinesis (Nikitin, 2000, p. 19). By the 
end of the 1930s, none of the “secret societies” were in operation. According 
to Aleksandr Nikitin, a historian who thoroughly researched the history of 
these societies and published the records of the proceedings of the NKVD, 
by the beginning of the 1940s all those who were related to these societies 
had fallen victim to successive waves of terror. By 1938, the mystical 
anarchists of Moscow met the same fate. Living under the protection 
of the Kropotkin memorial house in Moscow, they fought against their own 
anarchist comrades, so when it eventually came to eliminating all of them, 
the NKVD didn’t have much to do. 
Mystical anarchism, that unique Russian occult-revolutionary hybrid, 
spread around and became popular – and even dominant for some time 
in the Kropotkin house – through the activities of an ideologist called 
Apollon Karelin. He believed that a new ethical code must be introduced in 
order for the social goals of anarchism to be realized. The road to this new 
ethical code led through self-knowledge (“building up the inner self”), as 
it became obvious that actual revolution had resulted in the most horrible 
instincts breaking loose rather than true liberation – as he put it. Again, the 
threads come together: on the basis of reports about the proceedings, Nikitin 
convincingly reconstructs the personal and ideological links between the 
Knights Templar (aka Order of the Light) and the anarchists. In September 
1930, however, the knights were arrested: thirty people, intellectuals and 
students without exception, all confessed that they were fighting for the 
triumph of good – the light – over the forces of darkness, combining the 
scientific results of their times with ancient lore (Nikitin, 2000, p. 50). They 
were naïve, benevolent, committed people – we will probably never know 
how many of them returned to tell the tale.Control and Correction in the Period of Sedition
Perhaps the most beautiful metaphors for the extremely complicated 
relationship between Soviet state power and occultism are to be found in 
Tarkovskiĭ’s films. The healing of the boy with a stammer and the crossing 
of the border line in Ivan’s Childhood (1962), as well as the return of the 
father in Mirror (1974), an allusion to the end of massive repression, or the 
telekinetic scene at the end of Stalker (1979) – these were all understood 
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by viewers as allusions to the waking up of Russian society, especially 
intellectuals, and to their need for spirituality, for self-awareness, and for 
building up an “inner self”. There are lots of reports about that period when 
“dissidents” and “opposition groups” appeared on the scene, as KGB data 
and most contemporary party resolutions are now public. The relatively 
soft terror of the Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras did not threaten heretics 
with death: rather, warning/“prophylactic” measures were introduced in 
cases which were within the limits of tolerance, e.g. for the distribution 
of brochures inciting against the state (Kazmin & Kazmina, 2015, p. 15). 
This period is fittingly called kramola (sedition) in recent Russian academic 
literature, and this word accurately describes the common characteristics of 
sporadic spontaneous protests at the time: i.e. an instinctive reaction to the 
contradiction between the official narratives of the regime and the miserable 
reality (Kazmin & Kazmina, 2015; Kozlov & Mironenko, 2005). 
From the 1960s, foreign Russian-language media had a great role in 
spreading nonconformist ideologies, student and hippie movements, 
musical subcultures and fashions. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, human rights groups appeared in major cities (Alekseeva, 1992; Kozlov 
& Mironenko, 2005; Makarov, 2006). Thus, kramola was nurtured by various 
sources and triggered various reactions, especially from generations under 
thirty, and the state power employed the same “correction mechanisms” 
in each case: on the bench for those accused by the Soviet authorities, 
Zionists sat side by side with neo-Nazis, religious fanatics with leftists who 
reproached the regime for not being faithful to Leninist principles, moralist 
artists with liberal human rights groups, factory workers who revolted 
spontaneously with schizoid, rebellious adolescents. It is therefore quite 
strange that books and articles on the history of kramola do not mention 
groups and communities who returned or turned to esoteric traditions, yet 
in this period, kramola would be an appropriate interpretative framework 
for these communities. 
This time, the wanton idea of occultism hooked up with spiritual 
renaissance, and became one of the quiet manifestations of revolt. This scene 
was discussed the most thoroughly by psychologist Vladislav Lebed’ko in 
his three volumes of interviews entitled The Chronicle of Russian Sannyasa 
(Chapters from the Life of Russian Mystics from the 1960s to 1990). Sannyasa 
originally means the highest state of consciousness in Hinduism. The word 
also denotes those who quit everyday life, renounce earthly vanities, and live 
the life of the spirit. The author uses this word for the loose network which 
came into existence at the end of the 1960s, and consisted of people who 
turned away from Soviet society – as terror was beginning to abate – and 
started to experiment with self-knowledge and self-building, each in their 
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own fashion, with homespun methods, and with the help of whatever books 
were available at the time. 
This network consisted of a few dozen people who started to read the 
books of mystics, theosophists and occultists, like Carlos Castaneda, 
Gurdjieff, Ouspensky, Rerikh17, and many of these people were released 
from the camps at that time. They met these spiritual leaders, then gathered 
a small group of followers, and travelled to remote parts of the country 
to meditate and to find their true selves in a parallel reality. The main actors 
of this mystical underground scene, according to Lebed’ko’s description, 
were often deviant, mentally unstable, uneducated individuals who appeared 
at times in the position of the therapist, and at other times in that of the 
patient – the author of the book himself was a client before he became 
a psychologist. If one reads the interviews, or rather the literal transcriptions 
of the conversations, one does not find out whether they achieved anything 
at all. They suffered minor or major persecutions and forced psychiatric 
treatment, they were mostly broken by drugs and alcohol, but they kept 
preaching their truth that they had formulated in seclusion from the world, 
pieced together from fragmentary knowledge, relying mainly on their 
inner resources. The occultist movements from the beginning of the 20th 
century continued or revived in Sannyasa, but the spiritualists of the anomic 
period that came in the wake of the terror of Stalin’s regime did not want 
to channel occult ideas into a project of social redemption, and neither did 
they establish organizations or institutions for themselves: reading mystical 
samizdat, doing yoga for self-enhancement, and drug-induced psychedelic 
experiences were merely symptoms of that slow waking up which was 
sensitively perceived by Tarkovskiĭ in his early films.Instead of a Conclusion: Socio-Political Boundaries  Between the Rational and the Irrational Revisited
The complete history of the relations between Soviet state power and 
occultism has yet to be written. Strangely enough, authors who discuss the 
esotericism of the “state” and those who discuss “private” esotericism do 
not even reflect on each other’s findings. Yet apparently this wanton “small 
narrative” was present throughout the “great narrative”, changing its colour 
and form from time to time, turning to the left, then to the right, offering 
captivity or freedom, livelihood or illusions to those who encountered it on 
their way. It was certainly alive, as it is alive now, perhaps in a way that was 
predicted by Umberto Eco in Foucault’s Pendulum, or, to cite a Central-
17 On the import of ideas, books and travelling concepts from the East and from the West in this 
period, see Menzel, 2012b.
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Eastern European example, as the Hungarian writer Viktor Horváth 
imagined in his novel entitled The Small Crack: the transcendent has moved 
into cyberspace (the mystical analogy of which is Akasha), telepathy has 
been ousted by e-communication, psi warfare has given way to hacking 
and misinformation through the internet, secret societies have turned into 
closed groups on social media sites, and instead of recruiting followers, 
adepts now recruit new users for their apps. 
However, it would be premature to bury the occult doctrine, filtered 
through state socialism, in the world of cables and servers: occultism 
keeps rearing its head in political irrationalism and the emerging politics 
of illiberalism. In February 2019 Vladislav Surkov, also known as “Putin’s 
Rasputin”, a postmodern – or rather, post-truth – spin doctor, published 
a manifesto entitled “Putin’s Long State”. Surkov explains that Western 
political analysts are at a loss when they have to understand the paranormal 
behaviour of Russian voters. They put it down to populism, Surkov 
continues, because they have no other word for such behaviour, yet they 
should understand that this behaviour is going to be the norm in more and 
more countries in the near future. The choice of the word paranormal is far 
from being accidental, and Surkov does not put it in inverted commas: this 
word goes beyond the irrational behaviour of voters, and leads us to the 
occult, to a mystical spiritual community (sobornost in Russian), one of the 
central ideological pillars of the “Russian idea”. 
What Surkov talks about is a phenomenon that is considered trivial 
nowadays, a  phenomenon that is supported by the cognitive psychology 
of the 2000s, which was translated into the language of politics by George 
Lakoff: “Progressives have accepted an old view of reason, dating back 
to the Enlightenment, namely, that reason is conscious, literal, logical, 
universal, unemotional, disembodied, and serves self-interest. As the 
cognitive and brain sciences have been showing, this is a false view of 
reason. Oddly enough, this matters. It may sound like an academic issue, 
but this assumption about the nature of reason has stood in the way 
of an effective progressive defence and advancement of democracy” (Lakoff, 
2008, p. 2). And indeed, the consequences of this recognition transcend the 
framework of academic debates: although the Eurasianism of Alexander 
Dugin, an ideology that has gradually grown into that of Putin’s illiberal 
state since the 1990s, is very eclectic, there is one common element in 
all of its ingredients: an irrationality that affects people’s emotions, and 
which is able to contain any number of ideologies, from fundamentalist 
Orthodox belief through occultism to an Italian-style fascism. There are 
traces of his ideas in the ideology of parties like Ataka in Bulgaria, Syriza in 
Greece and Jobbik in Hungary. The main tenets of Dugin’s “postmodern 
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spiritualism”18 can also be detected in the main work of László Bogár, the 
chief theoretician of Hungarian illiberalism, the leading ideologue of the 
first Orbán government (Bogár, 2006).
By concluding my essay with these reflections, I do not mean to 
suggest that occultism, esotericism and the myriad of irrational ideologies 
stemming from them – from a mythic view of the nation to global conspiracy 
theories – are necessarily the hotbed or the result of illiberal political 
systems. They are, however, a concomitant of such systems, echoing in the 
rhetoric of political leaders, in campaigns built on irrational fear, and in 
the propagandistic elements of memory politics. The now defunct state 
socialism applied various strategies (depending on its needs and possibilities 
at a given moment) against various forms of occult/esoteric/irrational 
thinking, as the latter carried the possibility of uncontrollable freedom: at 
times, the state power tried to annihilate them, at other times, to integrate 
and exploit their results, and at other times again, they simply assigned 
the explanation of such phenomena to medical science and criminology. 
Today’s authoritarian regimes, however, recognized the psychological 
power of this “magic” (to use Durkheim’s classical term), and made it an 
integral part of their everyday communication, thereby rearranging the 
boundaries of values within society, reinterpreting the Enlightenment 
values of liberty, equality and fraternity, and controlling the “paranormal” 
behaviour of their adherents in a way that the creators of the Novosibirsk 
Radioson project could not even dream of.References
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Az ideológiák szürkületében: hatalom  és ezoterika a szovjet állami szocializmusban
A 19-20. század fordulóján Oroszország szellemi, tudományos és művészi 
életében az ezoterikus/okkult eszmék és mozgalmak meghatározó szerepet 
játszottak. Az okkultizmus szinte minden 19. századi ideológiával képes 
volt valamiféle szimbiózisba kerülni, s ezt a különös tulajdonságát a hivata-
losan ellenséges államszocialista ideológiai közegbe is képes volt bizonyos 
mértékig átörökíteni. A „dialektikus materializmus” alapjain álló hatalom 
viszonya az okkult eszmék továbbélési formáihoz ugyanakkor nem mindig 
volt egyértelmű: ez korszakonként és az eszmék társadalmi-közösségei ha-
tásától függően is változott. A tanulmány értelmezési kereteket próbál java-
solni az ezotéria és szovjethatalom sajátosan bizarr dinamikájú viszonyára, 
s arra a következtetésre jut, hogy az ezoterikus eszmék különböző megny-
ilvánulási formái – a (kvázi)tudományos, a közösségépítő és az individuá-
lis-önmegvalósító – által kiváltott hatalmi reakció más-más interpretációs 
megközelítést igényel.
Kulcsszavak: Szovjet tudomány, ezoterikus mozgalmak, parapszicholó-
gia, okkultizmus, természetfeletti jelenségek, ellenállás, titkosszolgálatok.
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W mroku ideologii: władza i ezoteryka w radzieckim 
socjalizmie państwowym
Na przełomie XIX i XX wieku idee i ruchy ezoteryczne/okultystyczne 
grały znaczącą rolę w życiu duchowym, naukowym i artystycznym  Ros-
ji. Okultyzm był w stanie wejść w jakiś rodzaj symbiozy z niemal każdą 
dziewiętnastowieczną ideologią i do pewnego stopnia mógł przekazać 
w spadku tę szczególną sposobność oficjalnie wrogim im ideologicznie or-
ganom państwa socjalistycznego. Jednak relacja między władzą państwową, 
opartą na „materializmie dialektycznym”, a różnymi formami okultystycz-
nych idei, które przetrwały w tamtym okresie, nie zawsze była jasna: zawsze 
zmieniała się ona wraz z upływem czasu i zależała od wpływu tych idei na 
społeczeństwo. 
Niniejszy artykuł proponuje pewne ramy interpretacji niecodziennej 
dynamiki relacji stosunków między ezoteryzmem i władzą radziecką, oraz 
dochodzi do konkluzji, że ogromna reakcja [władzy państwowej] wywoła-
na poprzez różne formy manifestacji idei ezoterycznych – quasi-naukowe, 
tworzące wspólnotę, indywidualnie się realizujące – wymaga wielu różnych 
podejść interpretacyjnych.
Słowa kluczowe: sowietologia, ruchy ezoteryczne, parapsychologia, 
okultyzm, zjawiska paranormalne, opór, tajne służby.
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